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East Europe Report

POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS

No. 1913



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NATO ANTISUBMARINE ROCKETS DESCRIBED

Sofia VOENNA TEKNIKA in Bulgarian No 6, 1981 pp 36-38

[Article by Engr-Capt 1st Rank Georgi Gerasimov, doctor of military sciences: "Antisubmarine Guided Missile Weaponry in Navies of NATO Countries"; "according to foreign press data"]

[Text] In the past two decades the combat capabilities of submarines have grown manifold. At the same time, new more effective weapons designed primarily for the destruction of atomic submarines have been developed, too.

The development of antisubmarine weapons has been aimed at increasing their speed of convergence with the target, at making certain of its destruction at a great depth, and at augmenting the power of the charge. The most modern type of weapon that meets these requirements is the PLURO [protivoloduchnoto upravlyamo raketno oruzhie; antisubmarine guided missile].

Foreign antisubmarine rockets are divided into two subclasses: surface-to-underwater rocket-assisted torpedo and underwater-to-underwater nuclear missiles.

The rocket-assisted torpedo is a combination of homing torpedo and long-range launch vehicle. The rocket-assisted torpedo travels the distance from the submarine chaser to the underwater target in the air, whereupon it enters the water near the anticipated position of the target and begins to act as a homing torpedo.

Modern rocket-assisted torpedoes include the PLURO's Asroc, Malafon and Ikara. The submarine chasers of NATO-member countries are armed with these.

The Subroc--the sole representative of PLURO's on submarines--belongs to the second subclass. Atomic-powered torpedo submarines of the United States are armed with it.


The Asroc PLURO system (Figure 1) consists of an Asroc rocket-assisted torpedo (RVR-5A), Mk-112 launcher (container type for 8 rockets), shipborne sonar AN/SQS-23 (or A/SQS-26), Mk-111 fire control subsystems and a shipborne storage, feed and reloading subsystem.



Fig. 1



Фиг. 2



Figs. 2 and 3

The Asroc rocket-assisted torpedo is a single-stage solid-fuel rocket with a warhead in the form of a homing torpedo (Mk 44 and Mk 46) or an underwater bomb with a nuclear charge with trotyl equivalent of 1-10 Kt (Lulu atomic underwater bomb). Basic characteristics of Asroc are as follows: length 4.57 m, and of the torpedo itself 2.57 m; diameter 0.304 m; span of stabilizer 0.76 m; launching weight 454 kg; weight of warhead 225 kg; maximum flight range 14.5 km; maximum effective range of fire 9 km; minimum flight range 1600 m; flight speed 1 M; thrust of rocket engine 5000 kgf.

The 22-ton shipboard launcher of the Asroc system consists of 4 twin packs, each of which holds two rockets. The launcher can swing 350° in the horizontal plane and each pack is trained at an angle of elevation up to 85° . The launcher makes possible single-shot fire or salvo fire in a combination of from 2 to 8 rockets, which are in a constant state of combat readiness in packs on the elevating rails.

The U.S. Navy is now adopting a general-purpose launcher developed on the basis of the Asroc PLURO and designed for the use of the Standard ZUR [antiaircraft guided missile] as well as existing and modernized Asroc rocket-assisted torpedoes. It is more economical, with less mass and size. The new launcher (Mk 26) will make possible for the first time fire not only with antiaircraft and antisubmarine rockets, but also ship-to-ship rockets.

The MK-111 fire control subsystem and the shipborne sonar are especially important elements of the Asroc PLURO. From the incoming sonar data the computer of the fire control system provides a continuous determination of the current coordinates of the target with allowance for the course and speed of its own ship, wind direction and speed, and air density. It produces the initial data which are automatically fed into the launcher and the rocket's onboard system. If necessary, fire is controlled manually from the captain's control panel.

The Asroc rocket has no guidance system; it receives forward motion through the booster and is guided to target on the ballistic trajectory. A hit in the area of the target is assured by pointing the launcher appropriately at the angle of site and the azimuth angle and by determination of the timer. At a moment determined by command of the timer the solid-propellant rocket engine breaks away in the area of the target, and the warhead and intermediate section continue the flight to the target. In this segment of the trajectory the rocket is stabilized by an immobile fin mounted on the intermediate section. If an Mk-44 torpedo is used as warhead, braking on this segment of the trajectory is accomplished by means of a braking parachute 1.8 m in diameter. Just before submergence the intermediate section breaks away and the torpedo enters the water, the parachute is discarded and the engine dropped. On reaching the set depth the homing instrumentation switches on and the torpedo seeks the target in a circle. If it does not discover it, it begins to maneuver in a cylindrical spiral, submerging initially to the set maximum search depth, after which it rises to minimum running depth according to a preset program. On detection of the target the torpedo begins to close in on it. If the target is not discovered, on exhaustion of its power resources the torpedo sinks.

The Asroc system is being improved so as to double or triple the range of fire, replace the Mk-44 torpedo with the more effective Mk-46 antisubmarine torpedo, as

well as introduce radio control of the rocket during its flight in air. Doubling of the range of fire at this stage of operation is warranted by the fact that such a range of target acquisition is made possible by the AN/SQS-26 sonar. The Mk-46 torpedo which moves faster and at greater depth permits the destruction of submarines traveling at a speed of up to 33 knots.

The Malafon PLURO system (Figure 2) is analogous in its purpose to the Asroc PLURO. It consists of a winged missile with a 53mm antisubmarine homing torpedo of L-4 type as its warhead (weight of the explosive 100 kg), launcher, shipborne sonar station MGS-4A and a radio command system for missile flight control. In external appearance the rocket-assisted torpedo resembles a jet fighter and is launched by a shipborne launcher by means of a solid-propellant rocket engine. Weight of the launcher is 10.5 tons. Total length of the rocket-assisted torpedo is 6.15 m, launching weight 1500 kg, diameter 63.5 cm, flight range 18 m, speed 720 km/hr. The guiding launcher is of the frame type, designed for one rocket. The ammunition is stored in an 11.5x12.0 m chamber below decks with a rocket torpedo feed system.

The coordinates, direction and speed of the target are determined by computer according to the data of the shipborne sonar station. The rocket-assisted torpedo is launched automatically at the target impact point. On the active segment of the trajectory, equal to one-third of the path traveled by the rocket in the air, flight takes place according to a fixed program. At the precalculated point the engine breaks away and the rocket-assisted torpedo continues its flight guided by a stabilized autopilot. If necessary, adjustments of the rocket flight are issued by the radio command control system on board the firing ship. Flight altitude is kept constant (100 m) and is monitored by a radio altimeter. In the target area at a precalculated point 400 m from the target, a tail brake parachute opens up, the flight of the carrier glider is slowed down, and the acoustic-homing torpedo breaks away by inertia, enters the water and destroys the enemy submarine.

Despite the significant range of flight the Malafon PLURO has substantial shortcomings such as significant weight and size, low speed and short torpedo range, for which reason it has not gained wide popularity and is in service only in the French Navy.

The Ikara PLURO system (Figure 3) was developed in Australia with the participation of the United States and England, and in the estimation of many foreign specialists is the best modern specimen of antisubmarine weapon of this type. In the development of the system the experience in designing and testing the Asroc PLURO was taken into account. This rocket is significantly superior to the Asroc and Malafon PLURO in its size and weight characteristics. A better version of the Ikara PLURO has been developed by an English company for the English Navy.

The use by surface vessels in their antisubmarine warfare of the PLURO systems considered above significantly increases the effectiveness of the attacks because the time from the moment a target is detected till a hit is made on it is shortened.

PLURO systems make it possible to fire on a detected underwater target in almost a 360° sector, and the warhead of rocket-assisted torpedoes can be delivered at a distance equal to the operating range of the hydroacoustic stations. Such

flexibility enables a ship which is part of convoy escort forces to attack the submarine without leaving its place in the formation or altering its course, as is obligatory when torpedoes and bombs are used as antisubmarine weapons. The commander of an enemy submarine does not suppose that it is under attack till the moment the rocket warhead enters the water and therefore the margin of time for attack avoidance is cut to the minimum. All this has considerable influence on the tactics of submarine employment since when ships are operating in a group, it is difficult to draw them away from the convoy escort before attacking the convoy.

The Subroc PLURO system is designed basically to combat atomic submarines. Its weight and size enable it to be fired from the conventional torpedo tubes of submarines. Launching weight of the rocket is 1853 kg; length 6.25 m; diameter of the solid-propellant rocket-engine case is 0.533 m; range of fire 40-48 km; flight speed M₁.

The basic elements of the Subroc PLURO system are as follows: instruments for the long-range search and detection of submarines; computers determining the movement parameters of detected submarines and working out firing data; nuclear underwater bomb; Subroc PLURS [protivoloduchen upravlyаем reaktivn snaryad; antisubmarine guided rocket projectile).

Target designation during firing comes from the AN/BQQ-2 hydroacoustic system. The PLURS is supplied with a powerful nuclear charge enabling the Subroc PLURO to be used in exceptional cases against surface ships as well.

On detection of a target by the AN/BQQ-2 hydroacoustic system, the elements of movement and distance to it are fed to the Mk-113 fire control subsystem. Data are fed into the Mk-113 system from the S/NS shipborne inertial navigation system, from the electromagnetic log, the echo sounder and automatic position plotter. With the help of digital and analog computers the Mk-113 system determines the current coordinates of the target, its movement vis-a-vis the firing submarine, and the rocket's point of impact with the target, and works out the program of its [the rocket's] movement, which is fed into the onboard guidance subsystem. Preparation of the rocket for firing takes about 1 minute.

Firing takes place from an underwater position. Once the rocket leaves the torpedo tube, the safety lock of the rocket engine is released and in 1 second the engine begins to operate. At the same time the guidance and control subsystems are actuated. With their help the rocket is launched in the prescribed direction and guided to the surface of the water at an angle of 30-40°.

The rocket is guided from the air segment of the flight trajectory by the inertial guidance subsystem and flies to the target at supersonic speed. At a set point (depending on the range of fire) the rocket engine breaks away from the forward section of the rocket, and the rocket continues its flight along the ballistic trajectory. As it enters the water, the protective nose cone safeguarding the forward section of the rocket is destroyed. The nuclear charge explodes under the action of a proximity fuze at a depth of 300 m or on striking the bottom.

The merits of the Subroc PLURO are the rocket's capability of being fired from conventional 533mm submarine torpedo tubes, thus eliminating the necessity of

developing special launchers; the long range of fire; the high speed with which it closes in on the target as compared with antisubmarine torpedoes; the possibility of using target indications obtained from ASW aircraft, dirigibles and helicopters and from radiosonic buoys.

A serious shortcoming of the Subroc system is its lack of a conventional-explosive charge.

The improvement of PLURO's is an important problem for all developed naval powers and great efforts are being exerted for its solution. In present-day antisubmarine warfare special attention is now being turned to the fact that submarines are carriers of nuclear rocket weapons and that in this perspective antisubmarine and antirocket defense systems are closely interlinked. Some countries are participating simultaneously on many research projects, but regardless of the results that are achieved and the various PLURO models that are developed it is obvious that these weapons lag seriously behind the development of submarines.

6474

CSO: 2200/126

CERTAIN SOVIET MILITARY VEHICLES DESCRIBED

Sofia VOENNA TEKHNKA in Bulgarian No 1, 1977 pp 20-22

[Article by Engr-Col Rashko Todorov: "Soviet Military Vehicles"]

[Text] Modern military vehicles. . . . We encounter them on the streets of cities and villages, on asphalted highways and rural dirt roads, in the field and on the tracts of labor cooperative farms and agroindustrial complexes, by day and night, in winter and summer. It is difficult to imagine modern military life without them. They take part in all activities of the military organization. The motor vehicle today is the symbol of man's power over machinery.

The Soviet automotive industry has traveled a long and glorious path. Lenin's decrees have become the foundation of a broad program for the development of automotive engineering in the USSR. The Moscow Automobile Plant came into service in 1931; the Gor'kiy Plant, which was intended for production, in 1932.

This fact is of tremendous defense significance for the Soviets. From the first day of the Great Patriotic War, almost the entire motor fleet of the USSR was mobilized for the needs of the front. The country's automotive industry almost completely met the needs of the front for motor vehicles of varying purpose. The figures eloquently bespeak the military drivers' scale of operation. On the day the operation began to destroy the German group surrounded in the area of Stalin-grad, 2500 drivers delivered ammunition, cargo and equipment. In the Berlin operation alone, up to 10,000 motor vehicles--almost a constant stream--passed over the main front-line roads in a day. During the battle for Berlin military motor transport carried 1.5 million tons of cargo. The military drivers of the Leningrad front who pushed through the "Lifeline" over the ice wrote an unforgettable page in the history of the USSR's Great Patriotic War.

During the war days the main burden of common-carrier transportation was borne by these vehicles: the GAZ [Gorkievski avtomobilen zavod; Gor'kiy Automobile Plant]-64 and GAZ-67, the GAZ-AA, GAZ-MM and ZIS [Zavod ot imeto na Stalin; Stalin Automobile Plant]-5.

At the very start of the Great Patriotic War the Gor'kiy Automobile Plant began to produce the first Soviet jeep--the GAZ-64. (After modernization (widening of the wheel track and alteration of the cab) in 1943 it began to be designated the GAZ-67, and a year later, after a number of improvements, it received the code number

GAZ-67B. This model with two driving axles was produced up till 1953. This vehicle was supplied with a 39-kW (54-hp) four-cylinder engine and developed a speed of 90 km/hr. To this day quite a few of the vehicles continue operating despite their great age.

The GAZ-AA was produced from 1932 on. In 1938 it was modernized and began to be designated the GAZ-MM. During the war years and in the following period the vehicle was produced in a simplified version. It was supplied with a 31-kW (42-hp) gasoline engine and developed a maximum speed of 70 km/hr with a load capacity of 1.5 MG (t). It was produced until 1950.

The ZIS-5 truck holds the record for long life. The first models of the vehicle came out in 1933 and were produced by various plants until 1955. The machine was supplied with a 54-kW (73-hp) gasoline and when fully loaded with 3 Mg (t) was able to develop a maximum speed of 60 km/hr.

During the war a three-axled vehicle with increased cross-country ability--the ZIS-6, on which at first the legendary katyushas [truck-mounted, multiple rocket launcher] were mounted, was produced on the ZIS-5 base.

Technical progress is the key feature today in the development of Soviet automobile manufacture. The past Ninth Five-Year Plan was called the "Automotive" Five-Year Plan. In 1975 the USSR produced 1,964,000 motor vehicles (including 686,000 trucks). On 16 February 1976 assembly of the first trucks began on the main conveyor of the Kama automobile-manufacturing complex. On its entry into operation this giant will produce 150,000 heavy trucks and 250,000 engines yearly.

Today the automotive industry of the USSR supplies the Soviet armed forces with new, reliable automotive equipment with high dynamic and strength characteristics that can perform all the functions involved in military training and combat activity. Many units and elements of the armies of the Warsaw Pact member countries, including our army, are provided with Soviet automotive equipment.

As a replacement for the high-roadability GAZ-69 passenger cars, which are well known in our country, the Ul'yanovsk Automobile Plant produces the UAZ [Ulyanovskii avtomobilnii zavod; Ul'yanovsk Automobile Plant]-469B with a 4x4 wheel arrangement. In developing the design of the UAZ-469B, principal attention was given to increasing reliability and useful life, improving the dynamic and economic characteristics, raising roadability, decreasing labor-intensiveness in servicing, and enhancing the comfort of the driver and passengers. A four-cylinder, 55-kW (75-hp) gasoline in-line engine is mounted on the vehicle, which is expected to carry 7 people and 100 kg of cargo or 2 people and 600 kg of cargo. The high-power engine in combination with a four-speed gear transmission provides the automobile with high tractional and dynamic characteristics. Its maximum speed is 100 km/hr. In developing the vehicle the designers extensively standardized its basic parts, assemblies and units with the UAZ-452 family of automobiles.

The GAZ-66 is especially reliable for operation under army conditions. The vehicle has two driving axles and is noted for exceptionally high cross-country ability. In respect of this parameter it approximates track-laying transport vehicles. It

is no accident that it is called "the great cross-country king." The vehicle has a load capacity of 2 Mg (t) and is capable of pulling a trailer with a mass of 2 Mg (t). It is supplied with a four-cycle, V-8, 96-kW (130-hp) gasoline engine. The vehicle is intended to transport various cargoes by road and across country and for use as a special vehicle with various kinds of equipment mounted on it. A central system for varying and regulating the air pressure in the tires while moving gives it the capability of advancing over soft ground and continuing to move in the event of minor damage to tires. The vehicle is supplied with a winch with a bearing force of 3.5 Mg (t) and can negotiate a ford up to 0.8 m deep. The low siting of the center of gravity provides the vehicle with good lateral stability.

Motor vehicles of the ZIL [Zavod ot imeto na I. A. Likhachov; Likhachev Automobile Plant] family have found the widest application for the needs of the army.

The first representative of this family is the ZIL-130 and modifications thereof. This vehicle is intended for the transportation of cargoes over all kinds of highways by trailer with a total mass of up to 8 MG (t). A powerful V-8, 110-kW (150-hp) gasoline engine is mounted on the vehicle.

The new representative of the family is the ZIL-133. The vehicle has a 6x4 wheel arrangement (second and third axles are driving axles) and has a load capacity of 8 Mg (t).

One of the most striking representatives of the ZIL family is the ZIL-131. Its wheel arrangement is 6x6 (and three axles are driving axles). It is intended for operation over broken terrain and across country. Many modern achievements in the area of automotive manufacture have been applied in the design of the vehicle. The rational layout of the assemblies of the vehicle, its powerful V-8 engine, the comfortable cab, the hydraulic power steering, the automatic device for engaging the front axle, the central system for regulating the air pressure in the tires, and the reliable protection of all assemblies against water put the ZIL-131 among the best world-class models of high-roadability vehicles. The ZIL-131 can negotiate fords up to 1.4 m deep.

The soldiers of the Soviet Army and of the armies of the Warsaw Pact member countries are well acquainted with the URAL-375D vehicles. These vehicles move equally well in both mud and snow and in sandy deserts. Since 1972 the machine has carried the State Quality Stamp on its radiator. It is equipped with a central system for regulating the air pressure in the tires, thus significantly increasing its cross-country ability. The URAL-375D's cross-country ability approximates that of caterpillar tractors. It can negotiate fords up to 1.5 m deep. The assemblies and units of the vehicle have been developed along the lines of the latest achievements of motor vehicle manufacture and are characterized by special strength and reliability.

Vehicles of the KrAZ [Kremenchuzhki avtomobiln zavod; Kremenchug Automobile Plant] family are also widely used in the army. Representatives of these are the KrAZ-257 and the KrAZ-255B (which has increased cross-country ability). The vehicles are intended for the transportation of heavy and outsize cargo, as well as for pulling heavy trailers and special systems. They are equipped with a V-8 diesel, 195-kW (265-hp) engine, which gives them high traction and speed performance.

The UAZ-452 family is winning wide popularity under army conditions. It includes the UAZ-452A (ambulance), the UAZ-452V (bus) and the UAZ-452D (flat-bed truck with sideboards). They are all maximally standardized. The high maneuverability and speed of these vehicles make it possible for them to operate equally well under all kinds of road and climatic conditions. The UAZ vehicles are noted for high cross-country ability (4x4 wheel arrangement) and can negotiate fords up to 700 mm deep and slopes up to 30°. With a load capacity of 800 kg the UAZ-452 can pull a trailer with a mass of up to 850 kg. The vehicle develops a maximum speed of 95 km/hr.

This is a small portion of the vehicles that are used for army needs. The Soviet automotive industry continues to produce new models, some of which will come into army service during the Tenth Five-Year Plan.

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CSO: 8108/1378

REAR ADMIRAL COMMENTS ON WARFARE TACTICS

Sofia NARODNA ARMIYA in Bulgarian 17 Jul 81 pp 1-2

[Article by Rear Adm Stefan Damyanov: "Field Training of Troops—The Enemy You're Fighting With"]

[Text] During a search for an "enemy" submarine a signalman of the N-th ship reported that he had caught sight of a floating object. The watch officer did not give it the necessary attention. As was explained later in the critique, it did not even occur to him that the "enemy" might offer active opposition and that in that case he was "laying" mines. In a combat situation such a lapse would be the loss of the ship.

This case is very illustrative of ignorance of the enemy's capabilities. Against such a lapse not only are watch officers not insured, neither are captains who underestimate or fail to study thoroughly the forces and resources, combat capabilities and tactics of the potential enemy. And if such examples are still encountered to some extent, albeit very rarely, they must be evaluated and analyzed on principle and with a sense of responsibility because many serious consequences can follow from poor knowledge of the enemy.

The training process in our naval units continuously affords officers an opportunity to widen their tactical horizon, while cruises, practice engagements with the air, surface and underwater "enemy" and every combat episode at sea require of officers accurate and specific knowledge about the enemy's combat capabilities, tactics and ratio of forces to resources, as well as the ability to use this knowledge to win the battle.

In the units where officers Pavlov and Khristiakiev are serving it is clear to every commander and seaman observer how necessary it is to know at what range the "enemy" must be detected in order to strike a successful blow at him.

In these and other units much has been done so that every ship will have the necessary aids whereby officers can obtain the information about the "enemy" that they need in order to enrich their tactical training. There are many so-called tactical corners in training rooms and simulators, and ships are supplied with literature and aids from which information about foreign navies can be drawn.

All this must be fully utilized in independent training, in group exercises and in tests before handing in course-setting, firing and special problems. These forms of training are contributing more and more to the intensification and fruitfulness of the training process and to the improvement of commanders' combat and tactical skill. It is desirable, for example that group exercises be conducted on competitive principles with precise adherence to time limits for the solution of problems and that tests contribute to the development of officers' creative thinking.

An especially large part in the tactical maturation of commanders is played by classwork and practice exercises in onshore rooms and simulators where the training of crews and command elements is improved. Here the tactical situation can be simulated conformably to enemy pressure.

Quite naturally, in order to train purposefully and specifically for the combat ahead of him, the commander of a ship or group of ships must take into account primarily their basic purpose. A submarine commander, for example, must study the tactics and armament of enemy submarines more thoroughly. But under no circumstances does this mean that he can be content with more general training for combat with enemy aviation and surface craft. Once put out to sea, a ship must be ready for combat with any kind of enemy. Even the most conventional duels necessitate a commander's overcoming significant difficulties of a psychological and tactical character. The situation surrounding a naval engagement is always complex and full of risks and hazards. Sometimes failure can be due to the loss of valuable minutes in order to obtain more accurate information in the dynamics of action.

In one training exercise the ship commanded by Capt Lt Gotsev was carrying on an antisubmarine search and destroy mission. The sonar operators detected the target in good time. The range permitted the ship to be attacked. But the commander wanted to obtain still more reliable contact so that he could determine the elements of its movement absolutely accurately. He wanted to score a conclusive victory, but . . . there was danger of letting precious time pass by. The decreased range might permit the "enemy" to strike a preemptive blow. At the insistence of the staff specialist who was on board the ship, the attack was delivered from the maximum distance and with great success. Then still a young commander, Officer Gotsev remembered forever [words illegible; possibly, "the lesson he received"] and drew correct conclusions. To the [word illegible] study of enemy tactics he now attaches paramount importance, and the successes of the crew are entirely natural. For two years he has been among the outstanding officers, a front-ranker in the Navy in his class. Also in noble competition are the other ships in this unit where there is strict observance of the principle of "learning whatever is necessary in war."

In one of the recent training exercises the command of the N-th unit conducted thorough and all-round training with staff officers and commanders of ships and groups of ships. In seminars, group exercises, staff practice drills and tactical conferences theoretical knowledge was extended and assimilated, and unity of views was formed regarding the use of forces and the tactics of their operations, as well as optimum versions of attack formation and methods of delivering an attack. In the concluding stage of the training a comprehensive practice drill was conducted

that corresponded to the anticipated volume of work for staff officers in organizing a naval engagement and conducting it. Much attention was paid to the training of tactical group commanders, as well as commanders of cooperating forces. A tactical conference, which was held against a complex and instructive background, contributed to good mutual understanding among commanders. To be sure, deficiencies were tolerated in the conference. Thus, for example, some participants launched upon arguments whenever commands had to be issued. Somehow or other the commanders announced their combat decisions, replete with stratagem, surprise and misleading of the opposing side.

Decoy groups were created in the combat formation. In maneuvering, the main striking force took into account the specifics of the area for military operations and used different forces for reconnaissance. Special attention was paid to the organization of tactical reconnaissance since the struggle for the first salvo made it obligatory to discover and disclose the enemy group at maximum range. The communication and force-control diagram, worked out in detail, gave results.

The experience from the training exercise that was conducted etc., etc. teaches that in order to train officers to fight a strong and crafty enemy, it is advisable to create a complex simulated naval-encounter situation. For this purpose neither resources nor time must be spared.

The main thing in the operation of forces is to tolerate no conventions (unless this violates safety measures). Oversimplification and cliché lead to unwarranted waste of time and material resources. Unfortunately, not all commanders take sufficient pains to simulate the operations of the enemy as he would be in a real engagement. All this introduces elements of formalism into the organization of training and has an extremely adverse effect on the level of combat readiness, since in such cases inadequate training sometimes lurks behind a high rating.

In carrying out initiatives in tactical training it is necessary to take a realistic approach towards an estimation of the enemy and learn to see his strong and weak points; forces must prepare to achieve victory in arduous and fierce combat with any kind of aggressor.

And the question, "Do you know the enemy you are fighting with?," every officer must answer in the affirmative not only in classwork, in training exercises and practical actions, but above all at sea with sure and decisive actions. In a word, we must be victorious not only on a map, but also in a genuine naval engagement. V. I. Lenin's precept must never be forgotten: "The most dangerous thing in war . . . is underestimation of the enemy and self-complacency because we are stronger. This is most hazardous and can lead to defeat in war."

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
CSO: 2200/128

NEW TRADE UNION SECRETARY ELECTED

Sofia TRUD in Bulgarian 17 Jul 81 p 1

[Text] Plenum of Central Council of Bulgarian Trade Unions

The 16th plenum of the Central Council of Bulgarian Trade Unions was held yesterday in the capital. It was concerned with organizational questions. Comrade Dimitur Dimitrov, chief of the Mass Organizations and People's Councils Section took part in its proceedings.



Kosta Todorov Andreev, member of the Central Council of Bulgarian Trade Unions and up till now first deputy editor in chief of the newspaper RABOTNICHESKO DELO [Workers' Cause], was unanimously elected secretary and member of the bureau of the Central Council of Bulgarian Trade Unions.

Due to his transfer to other important work the plenum relieved Maryan STOYKOV of the post as secretary and member of the bureau of the Central Council of Bulgarian Trade Unions.

The chairman of the Central Council of Bulgarian Trade Unions and candidate member of the Political Bureau of the Central Council of Bulgarian Trade Unions, Petur Dyulgerov, made a presentation on

some of the urgent problems related to the work of the trade unions in fulfilling the decisions of the 12th Party Congress. He analyzed the course of the fulfillment of the plan and of the trade unions' commitment during the first five months of the year; he focused attention on the participation of labor collectives in the compilation of the counterplan for 1982 and for the Eighth Five-Year Plan, and dwelt on certain urgent social problems. Finally, Comrade Petur Dyulgerov spoke, as well, about preparation for the forthcoming report-and-election campaign in the trade unions.

New Secretary of Central Council of Bulgarian Trade Unions—Kosta Andreev

Kosta Andreev was born in 1930 in the village of Bregovo, Khaskovo Okrug, to a poor rural family. He has been a member of the RMS [Workers' Youth Union] since 1944 and of the BCP since 1949.

On graduation from Kharmanli gymnasium he majored in journalism at Moscow State University. From 1955 to 1979 he was employed in the editorial office of the newspaper TRUD [Labor] as reporter, editor, section chief, deputy editor in chief, and editor in chief. Thereafter he was elected secretary of the International Organization of Journalists and in 1980 became the first deputy editor in chief of the newspaper RABOTNICHESKO DELO.

He is a member of the Central Council of Bulgarian Trade Unions. He has been elected a member of its bureau and member of the bureau of the US [Administrative Council] of Bulgarian Journalists.

Kosta Andreev is a candidate of historical sciences and the author of three books and many articles in which he considers important theoretical and practical problems related to the history of the revolutionary trade-union movement and the role, place and functions of trade unions under conditions of socialism.

For his high creative achievements he has been awarded the title of "Honored Cultural Worker" and given the distinction of the orders of "the Bulgarian People's Republic" and "Kiril and Metodiy."

6474

CSO: 2200/128

YUGOSLAVIA

MACEDONIAN PROBLEMS WITH ALBANIANS REFLECTED IN TETOVO

Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA in Macedonian 28, 29 Jun 81

[Article by Dragoljub Lazov]

[22 Jun 81 p 2]

[Text] Wait for Real Differentiation

Cases of nationalism in some circles, still being discussed disapprovingly, were noted at the last session of the Tetovo Opshtina Communist League conference

Tetovo is a city with a mammoth high school: 85 teachers teaching three languages, 1,913 students attending Macedonian, Albanian and Turkish-speaking classes. This city at the foot of Sar has many cultural and artistic societies and the sports are on the increase....

These places serve the needs of the multinational population of Tetovo Opshtina, of the young people who meet there. This makes even more important the duties and responsibilities of people in charge of raising and guiding the young, regardless of whether they are high school teachers or members of the managements of amateur cultural-artistic or sports societies.

Over the past decades the schools and cultural-artistic and sports societies in Tetovo have had something of which they can be truly proud. Today, unfortunately, some of them have fallen down on their jobs. This criticism was voiced from the prestigious rostrum of the opshtina conference of the Tetovo Communist League at its last session, held on 10 June. More specifically, the Dzeladin Zekiri KUD, whose membership consists exclusively of Albanians, and the Skendiya Sports Society, which also consists of Albanian athletes, most of whom were taken away from the other athletic organizations in the city, were cited for nationalistic manifestations. The bad situation at the Kiril Pejcinovik High School was also pointed out. We were told that there have been no clear cases of national intolerance but neither has there been any closeness and unity considered normal in such places. There has been no friendship among students of the same generation attending the Macedonian and Albanian classes. One reason for this may be the rather cold relations prevailing among their teachers....

Conduct of Political Activities

This situation, which has been the subject of intensive discussions lately, should be taken into consideration in presenting a more realistic portrait and in terms of the assessment of the opshtina communist league conference, according to which the political situation in the opshtina is good.

"This assessment does not mean that we have no problems and that we should lull ourselves," Idriz Idrizi, Tetovo Opshtina Communist League Committee secretary.

"The 1968 events have taught us to be cautious," added Bosko Merdzanovski, chairman of the opshtina communist league conference.

In discussing the political activities conducted by the Communist League in Tetovo, Idrizi explained that immediately following the hostile counterrevolutionary activities in Kosovo, based on great-Albanian nationalism and iridentism, the members of the communist league conference and the political aktiv of the opshtina and the committee held a number of meetings in primary organizations, local assemblies and villages. Such intensive work will be continued. There is virtually no summer holiday for political action and for the activists. The initial activities which consisted of assessing what had happened in Kosovo were followed by discussions on the situation within the organizations themselves and on the necessary measures to be taken....

We pointed out that the public remained virtually uninformed of such activities and that the impression developed that this organized political action was overdue.

"We organized task forces assigned to determine the state of affairs at the Dzeladin Zekiri KUD and the Skendija athletic society. We shall investigate specifically the study of the Macedonian language in the schools and the textbooks which, with minor amendments, have been entirely reprinted from Prishtina. Other topical problems existing in individual circles will be considered as well. After the proper studies have been made we shall provide both a political assessment and the qualifications. Eventual wrong manifestations and errors will be condemned sharply regardless of their authors," Idriz Idrizi said. He added: "To this effect we would like to have clear views and I believe that it is better to be slightly late than hasty."

When There is Silence

Meanwhile, not waiting for official assessment, the people are talking. Generally speaking, their discussions are not naive. Questions are being asked in the marketplace, in offices and at home, and answers are given as to what happened on the occasion of last year's visit which the "Dzeladin Zekiri" culture and arts society paid Albania, who founded Skendija and why. There is talk about differentiation in cadre policy, of polls taken concerning leading positions and especially the positions of managers of workers' organizations, to determine how many of them are Macedonians and how many are Albanians, of people acting behind the scene and of the existence of an atmosphere which drives some Macedonians to consider leaving Tetovo.

"Such manipulations are the product of the bazaar and, in my view, they are inimical," Idrizi said afterward. "Walk around the city and you will see that such is not the case. We formulate and implement cadre policy jointly. We may have some weaknesses but they are not so major as to create such a background....

Idrizi was unwilling to assess the situation with Skendija and the Dzeladin Zekiri society. He stated that it was not proper for him, as committee secretary, to prejudice the instructions which must be issued by the opshtina communist league conference. However, he was categorical when we asked him about the differentiation:

"The process has been started but I personally am not satisfied with activities so far. No real steps have been taken so far. This has been confirmed by the various back alley conversations. We will make a thorough study to see who has been working and what his attitude has been. This will apply to all levels, from the primary organization to the opshtina communist league conference," Idrizi said.

Let us point out that the other opshtina leaders, such as Bosko Merdzanovski, chairman of the opshtina communist league conference, Daut Ibraimi, chairman of the opshtina conference of the SSRNM, and senior comrades from the security and internal affairs service, shared the same views concerning the atmosphere in Tetovo, according to which it gives no grounds for any thoughts of leaving the city. This was illustrated by the fact that since the inimical demonstrations in Prishtina, only one hostile slogan was painted on the wall of the transformer station near Sarena Dzamija, that no single open organized nationalistic action has occurred, that there have been no excesses and that no influence has been exerted by the more than 250 students from Tetovo attending the university in Prishtina and, naturally, that things at the bazaar and in the shops are proceeding normally, without boycotts or incidents.

For the sake of the truth, however, we must point out that there are other views as well, some of them shared by people who could hardly be considered unnoticeable and who point out the tension which the people of Tetovo feel to a far greater extent than people from the outside, and cases of "petty" excesses on the street, in a store or in a pharmacy. In a word, they are mentioning the existence of a schizophrenic mentality.

We have no reason to mistrust the official representatives of the highest opshtina forums. Meanwhile, however, such matters are being discussed in Tetovo, for which reason they must not be ignored. It would be far more effective if the communist league or the Socialist Union would discuss the persistent rumors.... The fear that the asking of questions could harm the political action and the overall condition of the community is somewhat out of place. Problems cannot be resolved by silence or glossing over and even less by concealment. We have the bitter experience of Kosovo to prove this.

[29 Jun 81 p 2]

[Text] How the Macedonian Language Is Studied

Students from Sar and Suvogor villages come to enroll in the Kiril Pejcinovik High School in Tetovo without knowing a single

word of Macedonian although Macedonian is taught in the grammar schools. The open handling of problems is the most effective cure to bizarre rumors.

In a substantial number of Tetovo villages, inhabited exclusively by Albanians, particularly in the Sar and Suvogore villages, the teaching of Macedonian is so poor and irregular that the results are striking and the consequences serious, above all in the case of young Albanian students. In addition to 30 Macedonian and one Turkish, the Kiril Pejcinovik High School has 54 Albanian classes. We spoke with Mirko Krstevski, the principal. From time to time deputy principal Estref Emini joined in the conversation. We asked about the manner in which Macedonian was taught in Albanian classes.

"We are encountering serious difficulties. Students come from the villages with a very poor knowledge of the Macedonian language. Some of them have virtually no knowledge of the language although for six years of the eight-year primary school they have studied the language. Meanwhile, our curriculum stipulates that the language must be known."

It is difficult to catch up with what has not been taught in grammar school. This creates problems such as "The teacher is strict," or "What are we to do when the students are unwilling to study." Krstevski says that a certain number of Albanian teachers, ignoring the class counsels, insist that students should not be asked to repeat a grade because of the Macedonian language. All this discourages the students and it even occurs that some of them have still not mastered the language by the time of their graduation. Such problems lengthen the time spent at school. No such problems exist among students of Turkish nationality, for they speak Macedonian. There have been no nationalistic excesses nor clear manifestations of impatience among students in the high school. The high school has 531 Macedonian, 1,349 Albanian and 33 Turkish students. The good relations were helped by several meetings held by communists and young people. Nevertheless....

"At the last meeting of the opshtina communist league conference there was mention of opportunism and liberalism among us," said principal Krstevski. "There were suggestions of resolving matters on the basis of nationalistic and even [inforbirovski] positions without energetic opposition on our part. The party assembly is being informed now as to the number of directors in Tetovo work organizations who are Macedonians and the number of Albanians. Heads are being counted. If there is such talk among the teachers...."

Indeed, it is not easy to develop a feeling of closeness in such a cumbersome high school in which there are 300 to 400 students per grade. The fact is, however, that the students look up to their teachers who, obviously, are not setting the best possible example.

Actually, this is not our conclusion. "An energetic political action leading to real differentiation must be carried out in the high school, above all among the faculty. This will enable us to get results," we were told by Daut Ibraimi, chairman of the opshtina committee of the SSRNM.

What is Happening at the Dzeladin Zekiri Cultural-Arts Society?

Obviously, something will have to be done also in connection with displays of nationalism at the Dzeladin Zekiri. A great deal has been said on the subject in Tetovo. There is talk about the ceremony on the occasion of the 30th anniversary of the society, in 1979, or, more specifically, about the celebration which was conducted exclusively in the Albanian language, followed by the inadmissible writings in the official organ of the society, last year's Albanian tour, and the deletion from the repertory of the mixed choir of the society of a song which had a national-romantic content and was written especially for the Tetovo traditional festival of amateur Macedonian choirs.

It was precisely during the trip to Albania that this Tetovo society found songs which were rated highly by the Albanian newspaper BASHKIMI, particularly two beautiful folk songs, the song of the Prizren Albanian League and the song on Mits Sokoli, the folk hero, which describe the bright period of the mass people's heroism, praising highly the Prizren Albanian League and Mits Sokoli, the hero. The songs impressed the audiences and were sent off with warm applause...."

The previous was a quotation from the article entitled "Beautiful Songs and Dances" which BASHKIMI, the central organ of the Albanian Democratic Front, published in its 11 June 1980 issue. Such effects notwithstanding, a recent study of the work done so far by the Dzeladin Zekiri KUD states at one point that "we do not exclude the possibility that the repertory may have contained songs from the romantic period. However, their content is not of a kind to promote some kind of nationalistic euphoria. Such songs may be found in the repertories of the Skopje and Prishtina TV..."

We mentioned both quotes to illustrate the fact that things are still not being called by their real name and that attempts are being made to soften or conceal the state of affairs with a view to dulling the wedge of the political action. This does not involve the case of the Dzeladin Zekiri KUD alone. Obviously, an open and critical discussion is needed also in the case of the Shkendiya Athletic Society.

Let us say something about the society's publication. The inscription "Albanian Dzeladin Zekiri KUD" is found in Albanian in the upper section and in Macedonian in the lower. A comment here is hardly necessary. Officially, this matter is under investigation. However, we have been told that this heading was registered in this manner as early as 1950. Meanwhile, no one deemed it necessary to point this out, and this heading has been used in all correspondence to this day. The proper authorities will determine whether this was a case of lack of attention or a deliberate action. We have been told that practical measures have already been taken to make the society's seal consistent with Macedonian bylaws and the bylaws of the Tetovo Opshtina, as it conflicts with stipulations of these documents.

Specific Measures Must Be Taken

Studies are under way, leading to the adoption of specific measures for the elimination of such problems in the opshtina. Of late the reaction to incidents has become quicker. This, in connection with the incident or, more accurately, the fight

in Volkovija village in the course of the soccer game between Cuka, the home team, and Skendija, the chairmanship of the opshtina SSRN conference in Tetovo reacted immediately, most firmly blaming the culprits for interrupting the game. Today it is openly asked in Tetovo who needed an athletic society which, even though this is not included in its bylaws, in practice has become "purely Albanian," something which inevitably leads to the polarization of the public....

"We saw that this was not right. The idea has been expressed that the city should have a single athletic society within the framework of the Ljuboten SD [Athletic Society]. The management of the Skendija Athletic Society showed no understanding or good will. However, we are going to carry this out," Daut Ibraimi asserts. He added that a similar idea has been voiced regarding the cultural-art societies in the city which are intensively studied primarily from the viewpoint of their function in promoting fraternity and unity and bringing together the young people of different nationalities in the opshtina. It is expected that such societies will be consolidated and have their own sections.

Unquestionably, solutions can be found for these and far more delicate and difficult problems. Naturally, this can be accomplished to the extent to which such problems are brought into the open and become the subject of responsible and mature discussions motivated by the sincere desire to seek and find the best and most acceptable solution and to the extent to which such things are not dragged out, as this creates opportunities for those who are waiting for such efforts to assume second priority. It is equally clear that the political action will be a long-range one, particularly when it becomes a question of work with young people, especially in the schools.

A great deal is being expected in this connection of the forthcoming election conference of the opshtina communist league in Tetovo. Under such circumstances this conference could not be reduced merely to an accountability and election conference. We expect that the clear and specific statements which will be made will give it the aspect of a political action and will mobilize the membership and all working people and citizens in surmounting the current problems and conditions in the opshtina.

5003

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PROBLEM OF NATIONALISM IN KOSOVO DISCUSSED

Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 24-30 Jul 81

[Series* of articles by Jovan Raicevic: "What Is the Meaning of the Slogan 'Kosovo--A Republic'"]

[24 Jul 81 p 4]

[Text] Before answering the question put in the title, we will attempt to deal with the problems associated with the "question" itself. The demand for SAP [Socialist Autonomous Province] Kosovo to become a republic has, to be sure, never been put in official and public form in any of our political bodies or any self-managing body of delegates. But it has been put by the "public opinion" of the man in the street: in the 1968 demonstrations and the counterrevolutionary and irredentist actions this past April, and it has been done in an extremely arrogant and cruel way. Is that demand the "invention" of the man in the street himself, or is it the result of a deliberate and organized activity? If the latter, then what are those forces, internal and external, what is their social-class and ideological configuration, and what sort of motivations and goals are they guided by?

Those who were the pride and joy of Great Albanian hegemonism and nationalism immediately proclaimed themselves, and their own initiative, the advocates and defenders of the demonstrators, and they also supported their principal slogan--"Kosovo a Republic." The previous analysis has shown that this kind of support could be only transient and tactical in nature, but not strategic, since the ultimate goal of that hegemonism is the conquest of Kosovo, that is, its annexation to Albania. Why, then, does that hegemonism tack back and forth between

* This text is an extract from a longer work entitled "Ideoloska osnova Albanskog irredentizma i birokratskog nacionalizma (Povodom dogadjaja na Kosovu i njihove interpretacije u listu ZERI I POPULIT)" [Ideological Foundations of Albanian Irredentism and Bureaucratic Nationalism (Concerning the Events in Kosovo and Their Interpretation in the Newspaper ZERI I POPULIT)]. In it the author does not exhaust the topic of the slogan "Kosovo a Republic," it is also his concern in other parts of the piece, but the text we are publishing represents a section that stands on its own and is being published by the journal SOCIJALIZAM, No 6, 1981, while the entire piece will soon be published as a separate publication.

the tactical and strategic version? Because the first version, according to its assessment is more realistic--first a "Albanian national state within Yugoslavia," and on the basis of that constitutional legitimacy, the demand can be made for separation from Yugoslavia. And--what then? Probably attachment of the "younger" to the older parent state!

What Do the Facts Show

However, is that actually a realistic goal? As Marxists we examine the entire issue from the concrete-historical and class standpoint. Does the Albanian in Kosovo really have a vital interest in joining Albania? We categorically assert that more than nine-tenths do not want that, except a very few rabid irredentists. The most substantial proof of this is that Albanians, like all other citizens of Yugoslavia, who have passports and are constantly traveling in this world, can freely choose the place where they wish to work and the place where they wish to live, but, as far as we know, none of them has emigrated to Albania, and on a relative basis very few even visit Albania as tourists.

Ethnogenetic relations, the Illyrian-Albanian ethnicon on which the nationalists have been particularly insisting of late, are not enough; or--as Lenin would have put it--the mutual "sympathy of the population" is a prerequisite of unification, but not the only one, though it fairly often seems so to the layman. Are the general conditions and way of life which the Albanians have in Kosovo and which are possessed by all other working people in Yugoslavia truly such that they see a solution to their national existence only by joining the People's Socialist Republic of Albania?

Let us speak frankly about this: Is the Albanian nationality, as an ethnic minority living in Yugoslavia, ethnically oppressed in any way whatsoever, is assimilation being forced upon it, is its social, material and cultural development being frustrated? Does any nationality in Yugoslavia have any privilege which the Albanian nationality does not, does any ethnic group in Yugoslavia have any privilege which the Albanian nationality lacks, except the privilege of a national state, which we will be speaking about further on? As far as we know, there is no such privilege, except for the relative differences in economic level of development between the regions where the Albanians live and the other regions, but such differences also exist between entire national territories, which is the result of uneven development in the past and of the historical legacy in general.

Those relative differences in level of development will be a particular topic of ours, but bearing them in mind and also the fact that the Socialist Autonomous Province of Kosovo is only an autonomy with home rule, but not a state like, say, the People's Socialist Republic of Albania, we put the question the other way around: What are those privileges which the Albanian people has in Albania and which the Albanian nationality in Kosovo lacks, beginning with individual and human rights and freedoms and going to opportunities for material, social and cultural development? We must not, for instance, underestimate the fact that the citizens of Pristina Opstina alone, for example, have more household appliances and automobiles than are in the entire state of Albania. (To be

sure, the citizens in that country cannot possess an automobile, which is a sole prerogative of the state.) Moreover, the population in Kosovo knows better than we do what life is like in Yugoslavia and what it is like in Albania, so that our explanations along that line are perhaps superfluous.

A Specific Autonomy

Though it has the status of a province in which the Albanian nationality constitutes a huge majority, that autonomous sociopolitical and self-managing community has broad rights and opportunities not only for its own development, but also to exert an impact on the overall development of the entire Federation. This is actually a specific autonomy previously unknown in legal and political theory and practice. The province is a part of the Socialist Republic of Serbia, but it is also an integral element of Yugoslav federalism; it has its delegation in the Federal Assembly, in whose Chamber of Republics and Provinces, when it feels that some law or some other decision is not in Kosovo's interest, it can always demand a reconciliation of views and agreement on an equal footing with the others.

The province has its delegations and representatives in all government and self-managing delegate bodies, in the leadership organs of sociopolitical organizations, based on a quota established in advance and set forth in regulations and bylaws, that is, based on the principle of collective work and responsibility. Under our constitution an Albanian in Kosovo may be the head of the Yugoslav state (on one occasion he has already been a vice president) or the chairman of the SFRY State Presidency, which in our context is the collective head of state, and he will become that automatically when his turn comes.

We have good reason to ask: Is there any country in the world, in either east or west or in the so-called developing countries, where the chief of state may come from the ranks of an ethnic minority? We know of no such example.

Moreover, at the moment an Albanian is the president of the Social Alliance of Working People of Yugoslavia, the largest sociopolitical organization, whose membership runs into the millions; Albanians are delegates to the Federal Assembly and members of the Federal Executive Council (the government of Yugoslavia), members of the LCY Central Committee and its Presidium, ambassadors and generals, high federal administrative officials, but they do not occupy those positions solely because of their personal attributes or personal success in their careers, but because the constitutional system guarantees and ensures the Province of Kosovo, like the other republics and Province of Vojvodina, a proportional number of posts in the federal structure.

Then take education, culture and art. Since it represents a majority of the population in Kosovo, the Albanian nationality has practically all the attributes of a national culture: Its language, as is understandable, is the one that is most common, all the schools, from elementary schools to the university, have instruction in the mother tongue, it has three times as many university students as Albania, though its population is half the size. There is Albanian television in Pristina, a radio network, theater, opera and ballet, many newspapers and magazines, the Academy of Arts and the university in Pristina, a

library which in its magnificent building has more books than the National Library in Holland, the great Institute of Albanology, which even Tirana might envy, and so on. There also exists the large scientific and artistic output of Albanian creators, a legion of talented scientists in all fields, poets and writers, painters and musicians.

Differences in Systems

Personal freedoms and human rights of the working people and citizens in Kosovo, as an integral part of Yugoslavia, and the status of workers and of the entire working class in production and political relations differ qualitatively from those relations experienced by the working strata and citizens in the People's Socialist Republic of Albania. Those differences are indeed historically conditioned by essential differences that exist in the socioeconomic and political systems of the two countries: socialist self-management and nonaligned international policy in Yugoslavia and the ossified and mummified Stalinist system, with significant traits of so-called primitive communism, of a closed and isolated society, in Albania.

The differences between these two systems also give rise to two completely different nationality policies, that is, two diametrically opposed views on the nationality question: The policy of full national equality of nationalities and ethnic groups, unremitting deepening and development of that equality in Yugoslavia, and the policy of Great Albanian hegemonism, chauvinism and assimilation in Albania. That is why separation from the working class of the nationalities and ethnic minorities of Yugoslavia does not suit the workers of Albanian nationality in Kosovo--viewed from their class standpoint and historical interest, and this also applies to most of the peasants, since they would lose the ownership of their land, the right and opportunity to enter into association, and the right to personal freedoms, civil liberties and religious freedom.

Finally, the Albanian nationality in Yugoslavia, which during the revolution participated in creation of the new Yugoslavia, is unified with its fraternal nationalities and ethnic minorities in Yugoslavia, from which the Province of Kosovo, where that nationality predominantly lives, also receives aid for accelerated social and economic development, and it is involved with them in world-historical developments and the currents of civilization, in the struggle for peace and democracy and socialism as a world process. That nationality does, of course, as we shall see, also have its difficulties and problems, as do the nationalities in Yugoslavia as a whole.

If that is the case, and it actually is the case from the standpoint of the concrete-historical analysis of practice and trends of development, why, then, are the leading circles in Albania intensifying their hegemonistic and irredentist pressure on Kosovo, why in this effort are they forging ties with various emigre organizations, reactionary circles and various mercenaries of the intelligence services of various foreign powers? Their immediate goal is above all destabilization of the Yugoslav community, which means accomplishing the tactical version, and beyond that probing conditions for the strategic version!

[Text] Nationalism as Bureaucracy in Disguise*

However, the recent events in Kosovo have confirmed once again--both in theory and in practice--the old truth that nationalism regularly emerges as bureaucracy in disguise. The tendencies toward ethnic bureaucracy and a political bureaucracy based on nationality (whose structure includes elements of a merging of the republic-government and political-party bureaucracy) have been gaining strength in our society for quite a long time now.

These tendencies have been able to gain strength precisely because the economic substance, that is, the surplus value of labor, has been pumped out of organizations of associated labor in the sector of physical production on an enormous scale, with the sole purpose of augmented investment to round out the so-called national economies. The consequence has been that economic flows have been enclosed within the boundaries of republics and provinces, the unified Yugoslav market has been disrupted, the economic patterns of commodity production have been destroyed on the one hand, while voluntaristic subjectivism has become stronger in economic life and in the life of society in general.

National statisms have become stronger at the expense of self-management, and even social ownership has to a certain extent begun to be manifested as republic-government ownership, a kind of statist "national" ownership, but that we will discuss in the last chapter of this book.

These tendencies were also manifested in the Province of Kosovo, but in addition to that it was also the least developed, certain old disproportions were manifested in its development (perhaps in more acute form), and new disproportions were created. All of this favored the rapid strengthening of the political bureaucracy and its tieup with technocracy, and since the Albanian nationality is the most numerous in Kosovo--it can be said that the bureaucracy and the bureaucratic phenomenon arising out of the ranks of that nationality became dominant some 10 years ago, which does not mean that it does not also exist in parts of the other nationalities and ethnic minorities that live there.

Strengthening of Nationalism

Nationalism in a part of the Albanian nationality began to become rampant precisely when the bureaucratic phenomenon gained strength in the province's structure, as its administration developed and expanded, as many new institutions were created and old ones enlarged. That was also the time when ethnic bureaucracy was emancipated from the tutelage of bureaucratic centralism and unitarism and its shock forces, which were defeated at the well-known fourth plenum in the broader Yugoslav context, but that emancipation has specific significance and its own path of evolution in Kosovo.

* See Erratum at end of third installment--translator's note.

those defeated forces were especially compromised in Kosovo, where the various repressive measures and methods of their activity had also been the most widespread, and perhaps even most drastic, and they were also retained there long-term, precisely because Albanian irredentism had held on continuously and persistently. And it was able to go on feeding and maintaining itself since Albania remained loyal to its Stalinist and Cominform positions toward Yugoslavia. Relations with the countries in the "Cominform circle" began to change essentially, especially after the 12th CPSU Congress, but with Albania they remained at a standstill, even after the reestablishment of diplomatic relations.

Defeat of the Centralistic Bureaucratic Forces

The defeat of the bureaucratic-centralistic and dogmatic forces in Kosovo was especially welcomed, with good reason, was celebrated even as a "new" or "first" liberation, a great achievement in creation of the Albanian nationality's opportunity for greater affirmation. General enthusiasm ensued in Kosovo, investment projects were undertaken on a large scale, the university was set up, along with many new institutions in the fields of culture and art. However, in the criticism of those defeated Rankovicite forces, which was frequently reiterated, there were also exaggerations, both what wasn't and what was was spoken of,¹ the practices of UDB [State Security Administration] were rightly branded, but it was forgotten in all this that the defeat of those forces did not mean an ultimate defeat for the irredentist forces in Kosovo, that the UDB, which also had included members of the Albanian nationality, had made no small contribution to the fight against irredentism, and also that Albania's attitude toward Yugoslavia had not changed essentially in any respects.

Moreover, bureaucratic centralism and unitarism were equated in that criticism with Great Serbian hegemonism and nationalism, which, of course, was true only to a certain extent, since bureaucratic centralism and its various forms were nevertheless our general Yugoslav phenomenon. In the nationalistic euphoria in the early seventies, when Albanian nationalism had already begun to raise its head in an important way--the criticism of the organized socialist forces in Kosovo again focused on bureaucratic centralism as Great Serbian hegemonism, that is, as the principal danger, while irredentism and Albanian nationalism were apostrophized abstractly and by the way, more as a matter of principle. That is how the exodus from Kosovo became a taboo subject, for one reason because of the harsh climate created in society. During all that irredentism² in Kosovo was quietly vegetating, but it survived that "nationalistic crisis" in the early seventies.

But in this analysis we must go back a few years, since bureaucracy did begin to manifest itself as nationalism somewhat earlier in the province of Kosovo.

One thing that favored this was the fact that Albanians were increasingly represented in the entire political and self-management structure, which was also a normal process when we bear in mind that in the previous period they had been displaced in this respect, and the share of the Albanian nationality in the ethnic composition of the total population was rapidly increasing year after year, whether because of the high birth rate or emigration of members of other nationalities and to some extent also because of immigration from other parts.

The Thesis of the "Leading Nationality"

It is precisely that fact, misconceived, that is, the exclusively pragmatic approach to its interpretation, as well as the entire set of other circumstances we have mentioned, that led to Albanian national bureaucracy's beginning to be presented more and more as the principal representative of the interests of the Province of Kosovo, of all the working people and citizens, of the nationalities and ethnic minorities living in the province, all of this precisely on the basis of the Albanian nationality actually did comprise the predominant share of the population of Kosovo.

Various analogies were made on that basis, the thesis of the Albanian nationality as the "leading nationality" in Kosovo was developed, and in the bosom of that bureaucracy the demand was made for that nationality to obtain statehood, that is, for Kosovo to assume the status of a republic. The slogan "Kosovo a Republic" was thus launched for the first time in the demonstrations that took place in Pristina in 1968.

To be sure, even at that time there were various assessments as to such a political tendency, but the prevailing conception was that it resulted above all from the bad experience which the province had had in the previous period, particularly at the time of the activity of those forces which had been resolutely condemned at the Fourth Plenum of the LCY Central Committee. After all, that activity truly had accumulated quite a bit of mistrust, especially in the ranks of the Albanian nationality, and it had even created a certain fear with respect to the future development of the policy of equality among the nationalities.

At the same time, this tendency was looked upon as an expression of a certain ideological confusion, a disorientation, of a pragmatic and mechanical approach not only to complicated and delicate relations among the nationalities, but also to other essential issues in self-management and society, which existed at that time also in the other communities, since this was the time when one stage was being abandoned and a new stage was being entered, that is, when bureaucratic centralism and unitarism began to be dismantled on a broad front and the preconditions created for the faster development of self-management, and, within that context, for a more thorough policy and practice of equality of the nationalities. The point of departure was, of course, that well-known position of Lenin's concerning ethnic minorities that it was better to put too little salt than too much.³

But neither political concessions nor concessions in ideology and theory were undertaken, since the demand for statehood of an ethnic minority has nothing in common with development of our socioeconomic and political system, which is based on socialist self-management, the equality of the nationalities and ethnic minorities, nor with strengthening of their linkage and unity, nor indeed with Marxist theory. Comrades Tito and Kardelj criticized this political tendency from well-argued positions on several occasions--to be sure, in internal debates and discussions, but there were also a few public reactions, but unfortunately very few.⁴ Nevertheless, the impression was gained that the matter had "died down," that it was a question of an ideological disorientation that had already been discussed.

FOOTNOTES

1. In VJESNIK U SRIJEDU (No 1001, 7 July 1971), for example, there was a long article by a certain Nebil Duraku entitled "Who Has Been Moving Out of Kosovo," in which it is stated that 230,000 inhabitants from Kosovo had emigrated to Turkey between 1953 and the Brioni plenum of the LCY Central Committee and even 1 year after that, that is, up to the end of 1967, and it is added that "very few if any of these emigrants were Turks, but they were rather Albanians." The assertion of this article, which was commented on in an expanded meeting of the Provincial Committee of the League of Communists of Kosovo held in July 1971, was that it was not the Serbs who were emigrating from Kosovo, but Albanians, under the pressure of the UDB, as "converted" Turks. However, it later turned out that this was misinformation, that the figure of 230,000 did not pertain to Albanians emigrating from Kosovo, but to total emigration from Yugoslavia over the period from 1953 to 1961 (NIN, No 1076, August 1971). But nothing was done toward public denial of that misinformation in Kosovo.
2. Irredentism is a unique form of nationalism in its negative aspect. Irredenta (which in Italian signifies unredeemed territory, under foreign rule) signifies a chauvinistic policy of taking territory from others; territorial claims are usually supported by various "historical rights," by the same language, culture and ethnic characteristics, and so on. A second meaning refers to the aspiration of an ethnic minority in some country to join the parent country. The well-known Italia irredenta was the Italian chauvinistic and fascist aspiration in the past to occupy parts of Yugoslavia on the basis of "historical rights."
3. See: V. I. Lenin, "On the Nationality Question or 'Autonomization,'" in an anthology of writings by Marx, Engels and Lenin on the nationality question (Svjetlost, Sarajevo, 1973, pp 188-189). Hereinafter referred to as nationality question....
4. See the article by Kiro Hadzi Vasilev entitled "Self-Determination and Self-Management" (KOMUNIST, in two parts, 14 November 1968 and 21 November 1968), which was one of the rare public reactions to the slogan "Kosovo a Republic" at that time and in which the theoretical positions were presented as to why Kosovo could not be a republic.

[26 Jul 81 p 4]

[Text] The Essence of the Slogans "Great Albania" and "Kosovo a Republic"

The development of events, however, showed that bureaucracy from the ranks of the Albanian nationality, aside from a certain ideological confusion and disorientation, was still weak and insufficiently consolidated at that time, and above all was not sufficiently linked with the forces of petty bourgeois nationalism, especially from the ranks of the intelligentsia, which was still small. The forces of irredentism had been recovering from their lengthy "war" with the UDB, but they received the slogan "Kosovo a Republic" with a certain surprise, shock

and mistrust precisely because it was not originally theirs, though they did join in the demonstrations in 1968, since everything that led to destabilization and exacerbation of political tension in our country ultimately suited their nature. National bureaucracy,⁵ though it was surprised by the "general support" of irredentism, did not incline towards a political alliance with it, and even stood quite distinctly apart from it, at least at that time, since there is a difference in their nature and aims.

Irredentism in Kosovo operates in a combined form: as a movement for separation from Yugoslavia and unification with Albania, but also as a chauvinistic and expansionistic campaign of the government of Albania, as an operation for annexation, for territorial reshaping of borders, on the basis of alleged "historical rights," "mental and psychological mutual sympathies of the population," "pure ethnos," and so on. In addition to that, of course, Albanian irredentism also takes the form of an ideological phenomenon offering another socialist alternative, that is, state collectivism, with the essential traits of primitive communism. Its basic slogan is "Great Albania," while that of bureaucratic-statist nationalism in the Albanian nationality is "Kosovo a Republic," but these are not simple identities, nor identical ideological creations either in form or content, even though sometimes their phraseology and "argumentation" is similar or coincidental.

The Conduct of the Cominformists and Stalinists

The Cominform-Stalinist enemies of socialist, self-managing and nonaligned Yugoslavia, which are well known to us both front and back, who are willing to associate even with the black devil, with various emigre circles and foreign networks of intelligence agents, not only to destabilize and disintegrate our community, but also to dissever and take over its particular parts, comport themselves under the first slogan.

Under the second slogan--"Kosovo a Republic"--are the bureaucratic-statist and nationalistic forces from the ranks of the Albanian nationality, united bureaucrats and nationalists, who, by virtue of their ideological confusion and hard-headedness, are striving to resolve the problems of the Albanian nationality in Kosovo by mechanical constitutional guarantees, but in practice, because of their narrow and personal interests, want to climb on the back of that nationality and the other nationalities in Kosovo. It is a question, then, of a political-ideological tendency of those representing provincial bureaucracy and nationalism, with separatist foreshadowing, but not exclusively on the irredentist basis of annexation of Kosovo to Albania. Bureaucratic nationalism, with its separatist aspiration, may--to speak alphabetically--also have other claims and aspirations, but they cannot be guessed at without arguments.

Certainly this is not the sole bureaucracy of a nationality in this country which has created various difficulties for us--to be sure, they differ in severity and consequences, and we have managed to deal with them. Bureaucratic nationalism in Kosovo has gone furthest in its escalation. But regardless of that, we must not forget that for all its counterrevolutionary and bureaucratic ugliness and unacceptability, it does nevertheless come from the ranks of the

Albanian nationality, which unfortunately, because of a burdensome historical legacy, is still fighting against the greatest difficulties in this country.

Political Colorblindness and "Collective Shame"

A distinction, then, should be made between Albanian irredentism and bureaucratic nationalism in Kosovo, between those bearing the slogan "Great Albania" and those bearing the slogan "Kosovo a Republic" in the political-ideological differentiation which is now taking place in Kosovo as well as in all debates outside Kosovo concerning the events that have taken place in Kosovo. This, of course, should be done above all by party members and working people in Kosovo, it is they who are in the greatest need for detailed analyses of this kind. After all, one criterion used in differentiation might be, for example, participation in demonstrations, and a quite different criterion might be the manner in which someone became part of the demonstrations, whether he marched under the slogan "Great Albania" or "Kosovo a Republic," often not even knowing what they meant and all the various consequences that might result therefrom for our Yugoslav community.

Those outside Kosovo who are debating and writing about Kosovo must be particularly mindful of this differentia specifica between irredentism and bureaucratic nationalism in a portion of the Albanian nationality, since by cramming all into the same basket they cannot correctly perceive the true colors of the actors in the events in Kosovo. But political colorblindness, usually malicious in intent, can in this case serve only those who insist at all costs on the "collective shame" of the Albanian nationality, who put in too much salt instead of too little! Fully aware of the seriousness of the situation that has been created, especially that part of the situation which resulted from the unhappy slogan "Kosovo a Republic," we feel that again on this occasion, as party members and Marxists, we should adhere to that maxim of Lenin's, that is, that "in the given case it is better to put too much salt on the side of leniency and mildness toward ethnic minorities than to put too little" [sic].

At the same time, in no case does this mean that we can make political-ideological compromises and concessions. Further on we will in fact attempt to delineate and define our attitude toward the slogan "Kosovo a Republic," but first let us finish our examination of relations between irredentism and bureaucratic nationalism in a portion of the Albanian nationality.

What happened in development of bureaucracy from the ranks of the Albanian nationality, especially after 1968, was more or less the same as what happened with the other national bureaucracies in our country. Emancipating itself from bureaucratic centralism and unitarism, and striving to present itself as the only interpreter of the global interests of "its" nationality and "its" working class, each bureaucracy in each of our republics and provinces inevitably strove to establish ties, to form an intimate political alliance, with petty bourgeois nationalistic groups, especially with groups in the national intelligentsia: in science, culture and art.

The National Bureaucracy With the Nationalistic Intelligentsia

After all, the bureaucracy possesses the institutions and the power, but it does not possess sufficiently the nationalistic spirit; the intelligentsia mainly does not possess the institutions (the bureaucracy strives to impose "its own people" even on those institutions which eminently belong to the intelligentsia), but it does possess consciousness and knowledge of the ethnic identity, it can create a nationalistic ideology and national myth, and therefore this kind of unification, not only, of course, of the bureaucracy and the nationalistic portion of the intelligentsia, but indeed of all other nationalistic forces, is indeed a prerequisite for the creation and deportment of the national bureaucracy as the representative of the global interests of the nationality, and, in this case, of an ethnic minority as well.

In the struggle of the League of Communists, of the working class and of the working people for self-management, and in particular for it to make inroads at the level of the entire society--whether in the framework of the ethnic collectivities or in the framework of the entire Yugoslav community--this tieup between the national bureaucracy and the nationalistic intelligentsia has proved to be one of their toughest adversaries, one on which quite a bit of time and labor has been spent, and there have even been temporary defeats, but victories as well, though they cannot boast that they have gotten to the head of this phenomenon, even today it follows them like a shadow.

This is exactly what happened in Kosovo as well. The bureaucracy in a portion of the Albanian nationality was able to operate more strongly and to escalate only when it came to have an ally in the nationalistically oriented intelligentsia from among the ranks of its own nationality. Young and fledgling, enthusiastic and happy that for the first time it was offered the opportunity to fight for affirmation of its own nationality in the fields of science and culture, or, more accurately--to freely create its own science, culture and art--that intelligentsia in a relatively very short period of time did actually achieve exceptional results. Nor did it particularly bother anyone that in the enthusiasm and desire to create as much as possible as soon as possible, there was here and there an overlay of ethnic romanticism.

Yet the turning point came when the bureaucracy formed a firm political alliance with the nationalistic part of the intelligentsia, when, because of its own needs and assurance that all the problems of the Albanian nationality would supposedly be solved if it were granted statehood, it called upon the intelligentsia for "scientific evidence" and "historical argumentation" for accomplishing its designs. But that kind of "evidence" and "arguments" could be found and exist only in Tirana, in its archives, in its writing of history, and indeed even in the history of the Albanian Workers' Party.

FOOTNOTE

5. In this book we shall be using the terms "national bureaucracy" and "bureaucratic nationalism," though they are imprecise and, strictly taken, even inaccurate, since it is not a question of bureaucracy in the ethnic community,

but in a portion of the Albanian nationality (ethnic minority), but in the absence of a better expression and for the sake of convenience of expression we use both terms.

Erratum

In yesterday's installment of this feature article a typographical error occurred in that a term was transposed in the first sentence of the text and in the title. In its correct form it should have been: "Bureaucracy as Nationalism in Disguise." We apologize to the author and to our readers.

[27 Jul 81 p 4]

[Text] Two Tendencies on the Nationality Question

Which accounts for the "need" for increasingly intensive scholarly and cultural cooperation between Kosovo and Albania, and then, if an exception is made for teachers from Tirana in the technical sciences, it was confined mainly to the writing of history, ethnography and folklore, and even to uncritical printing of scholarly and literary works of certain authors from Albania in Pristina. That collaboration gave rise to the theses of the "Illyrian-Albanian ethnicon" as an "autochthonous" and "pure ethnos" on "compact Albanian territories"--all those things which awaken and create the nationalistic spirit, which represent an "opiate of the people," especially the young generation, and so on. And, what is worst, that "evidence" and those "arguments," contained in the unified nationalistic literature, were able to serve both slogans--both "Great Albania" and "Kosovo a Republic."

This also injected the greatest confusion and ideological disorder, but it served well for indoctrination and manipulation, especially in handling the young generation. Perhaps bureaucratic nationalism even counted on this, on the support of irredentism, so that the pressure in the Yugoslav public to acquire the "status of a republic" would be as strong and impressive as possible, but irredentism also saw its own chance in all of this, and it supported the slogan "Kosovo a Republic" as a transitional and tactical version of its own.

However much it might have appeared that "love at a distance" had been established between bureaucratic nationalism in a portion of the Albanian nationality and Albanian irredentism, it is difficult to believe that a political alliance was also established between them.

After our endeavor to show how the adverse political process which launched the slogan "Kosovo a Republic" took place, our task now is to attempt to clarify and demonstrate why SAP Kosovo cannot be a republic. There are several reasons for that, there have been public debates about them, especially concerning more consistent application of the features contained in the SFRY Constitution and the Constitution of SR [Socialist Republic] Serbia, and perhaps the entire issue has been even dealt with too much from that exclusive angle.

The Nationality and Self-Determination

In our exposition up to this point we have already pointed out that a nationality's right to self-determination would be a mere fiction if it did not also express itself in political terms as the right to form a national state, that is, as the right to voluntary secession from a multinational state. This is Lenin's principle, which he also formulated this way: "This means that 'self-determination of the nationalities' in the program of the Marxists can have no other meaning from the historical-economic viewpoint than political self-determination, independent statehood, the formation of a national state."⁶

Historical development, according to Lenin, knows of two tendencies concerning the nationality question. The first is the awakening and creation of national movements, the struggle against any oppression of a nationality, the creation of the national state. The second is the constant development and linkage of nationalities and their states in all domains of human activity, the breaking down of all national barriers, the creation of the international unity of capital, of international life in general, of science, of politics, and so on. "Both tendencies," Lenin said, "are capitalism's holy law. The first predominates at the beginning of its development, the second characterizes mature capitalism, the capitalism which is following its transformation into socialist society."⁷

This also contains the progressive and civilizing side of the evolution of the nationalities as large social groups and their institution as national states. Wherever that process has not been taken to the end, where they have remained multinational states such as tsarist Russia or the old Yugoslavia--these were the exceptions of European capitalist history and cases of its lateness in those areas. The national state, then, is the "rule of capitalism," "the state with a variegated ethnic composition represents backwardness or an exception" (Kautsky), and those "backwardnesses" and those "exceptions" had to be resolved by socialist revolution.

In that process of the creation of national states, however, national boundaries could never be drawn so that within them remained a completely "pure" and "homogeneous" ethnic population, that is, so that all the members of a state would at the same time be members of the same nationality. That is why through the confluence of various historical circumstances larger or smaller parts of the various nationalities had to remain outside the boundaries of their national states, that is, they found themselves to have the status of ethnic minorities in another national state. This was especially characteristic of the process of creation of national states in the Balkans.

Ethnic Minorities

Finding itself to be an ethnic minority within another state, the basic and vital question for it was to secure itself against any form of national oppression and discrimination, to have full rights as a nationality, to use its mother tongue and to have schools in its own language--in short, all the freedoms of a nationality and full equality with members of the nationality it lives with and--which is very important--that that equality also be guaranteed in law, precisely

because as a minority it cannot set itself up as some sort of separate "state" in a state that already exists. "Not even the slightest oppression, nor the slightest injustice toward the ethnic minority!--those are the principles of worker democracy."⁸

Few, indeed hardly anyone, have consistently held to that principle concerning the freedoms of ethnic minorities as an integral part of human freedoms in general, nor did they in the good old Europe, in which the process of formation of modern nations had its first historical beginnings. Those freedoms are in one way or another restricted, withheld, abridged or completely destroyed even by those who boast of their democracy and who fight for human rights in other countries as though the rights and freedoms of ethnic minorities were not par excellence an integral part of those elementary human rights and freedoms.

This is done both in the west and in the east; the working class and communist movement, especially in certain periods, has failed the examination over the question of the equality of ethnic minorities, and certain parties even today have been unable to rid themselves either of the assimilationist or even chauvinistic attitude toward ethnic minorities. In the time of Stalinism, let us state it openly, and even in the process of homogenization on the basis of the ideological conception of the so-called unified "socialist nation"--ethnic minorities of the South Slav nationalities completely disappeared or have been slowly vanishing in certain socialist countries, while minorities of those same nationalities which live in Yugoslavia have the same rights and freedoms as nationalities as those nationalities which are components of Yugoslavia.

These are generally known and acknowledged facts, and they cannot be passed over in silence nor evaded even now when in the European press, both west and east, they are writing about the so-called Kosovo events, or when attempts are being made here and there to distort the real status of the ethnic minorities in our country. But the altogether equal status of the ethnic minorities with the nationalities which are components of Yugoslavia did not fall from the skies, nor was it the fruit of any sort of demagoguery or temporary tactic, but the culmination of a component of the enduring policy and strategy of the Yugoslav socialist revolution and the result of the persistence of its subjective forces in constantly and consistently implementing that policy and strategy.

On the Positions of Bourgeois Nationalism

The point is that that strategy and fundamental Marxist policy and practice in achieving the equality of ethnic minorities has hardly existed at all in many parties of the working class and communist movement, and therefore there have been disputes even among certain socialist countries. And not just disputes over assimilation, but the taking up of the positions of bourgeois nationalism, including claims for the reshaping of national borders and the annexation of parts of one state by another state, solely because in those parts, together with the population of one nationality, there is also an ethnic minority. Thus the very existence of ethnic minorities has unfortunately become a source of conflicts and dissension among peoples, even among those in which the socialist process has been initiated.

Nevertheless, the League of Communists and the Yugoslav socialist self-managing community of equal nationalities and ethnic minorities, aside from having guaranteed full equality of all nationalities and ethnic minorities by their revolution, emphasize the principle: Ethnic minorities are not and may not be a source of discord, but must be bridges binding peoples together. They have held to that principle and will hold to it always, regardless of the good or bad relations with the parent nations whose ethnic minorities happen to be in our country.

Though the new Yugoslavia has often been forced in the postwar period to defend itself against external attacks of various neighbors, even in the period when in certain neighboring countries the elementary rights of the minorities of its nationalities were drastically extinguished--the development of the ethnic minorities in Yugoslavia has proceeded normally and without disruptions, since our entire strategy, even from before the war, during the National Liberation War and revolution, and in the construction of socialism on the foundations of socialist self-management--rests on a principled attitude toward ethnic minorities that is based on Marxism.⁹

FOOTNOTES

6. "Nationality Question ...," p 64.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid., p 55.
9. See "Resolves of the Executive Committee of the LCY Central Committee on the Questions of Ethnic Minorities," adopted 2 March 1959, published in KOMUNIST, 28 June 1982 [sic].

[28 Jul 81 p 4]

[Text] Why Kosovo Cannot Be a Republic

It even went so far that the old term "ethnic minority" was replaced by the term narodnost ["nationality," but used officially in Yugoslavia to denote ethnic minorities--translator's note] in order to express the full equality of the ethnic minorities in Yugoslavia with the nationalities making up the country,¹⁰ which sometimes causes terminological confusion outside our country. All of this, at least certain essential elements of that strategy of ours toward ethnic minorities, was meant to give a better understanding of the problem we are discussing, that is, why the Albanian ethnic minority in Kosovo cannot set itself up as an organized separate state or--which is the same thing--why Kosovo cannot have the status of a separate republic in the existing federal system. As we see it, there are many reasons for this in the realm of principles and theory, and we shall attempt to expound them here.

The Reactionary Nature of the Demand

First Reason. Setting up ethnic minorities as a separate state would be a retrograde and ahistorical process, and from the standpoint of the working class movement and Marxism a return to the petty bourgeois and bourgeois conception of society, of nationalities "in general" and to nationalistic ideology, in which emphasis would be put only on the ethnic factors and the common language, and even more on feudal tribal relations than on present-day bourgeois relations and views concerning the organization of society as to nationalities.

The view of the working class, the working class approach to that kind of organization of the life of the nationalities, would have been abandoned, not only because the working class movement would thereby be broken into pieces and would become disunited, not only because the principles of its organization as an essential prerequisite of its unity and activity would be frustrated, but because in socioeconomic and political relations, production relations above all, tendencies would develop utterly opposed to the world-historical flows of the contemporary production of values, modern science and technology. Put simply, the entire objective social basis of the struggle for progress, democracy and socialism would be undermined or essentially jeopardized, since the point of departure of that kind of organization of society would not be the working class, but the nationality!

The pattern of the historical process of the formation of the modern nations and their national states and the nature of all the factors that contributed to their institution are well known in social theory. That is not our topic here, but the parts of already-existing nationalities, their national minorities, whose "statehood on the basis of self-determination" is being demanded, but within another state--the state where they live. It is a question, then, of "initiating" a kind of process that has never been known before in history.

Ethnic Composition of the Population in SR Serbia

Yet historical processes initiate and open up certain class-political forces on the basis of goals and prerequisites which they discover in the objective social reality and its contradictions. If that is the case, we put the question: On the basis of what objective world-historical tendencies is such a demand made, what are the essential postulates and criteria of its possible achievement? Before answering that question let's look at the ethnic composition of the population of SR Serbia, since aside from the Serbian nationality and parts of other nationalities which are the components of Yugoslavia, there are also several ethnic minorities, referred to as narodnosti.

The following table shows that in addition to Serbs and members of all the other nationalities which are components of Yugoslavia, there are some 10 ethnic minorities in SR Serbia; actually there are more, but probably they have a negligibly small number of members. It is also evident that the share of the Albanian ethnic minority in the overall composition of the population has been increasing steadily, while that of others has stayed at the same level or has even been declining, which is affected by many things--from mixed marriages between the nationalities to the growth of the category "Yugoslav," and so on.

Ethnic Composition of the Population of SR Serbia

Nationality	1948	%	1953	%	1961	%	1971	%
Total	6,527,966	100.0	6,978,154	100.0	7,642,227	100.0	8,446,581	100.0
Montenegrins	74,860	1.0	86,061	1.2	104,753	1.4	125,260	1.5
Croats	169,864	2.6	173,246	2.5	196,409	2.6	185,894	2.2
Macedonians	17,917	0.3	27,277	0.4	36,288	0.5	42,675	0.5
Moslems	17,315	0.3	81,081	1.2	93,467	1.2	154,327	1.8
Slovenes	20,998	0.3	20,117	0.3	19,957	0.2	15,957	0.2
Serbs	4,823,730	73.9	5,152,939	73.8	5,704,686	74.6	6,016,811	71.2
Albanians	532,011	8.2	565,513	8.1	699,772	9.1	984,760	11.7
Bulgars	59,472	0.9	60,146	0.9	58,494	0.8	53,800	0.6
Czechs	6,760	0.1	5,948	0.1	5,133	0.1	4,149	0.0
Italians	863	0.0	636	0.0	586	0.0	566	0.0
Hungarians	433,701	6.6	441,907	6.3	449,587	5.9	430,314	5.1
Romanians	63,130	1.0	59,705	0.9	59,505	0.8	57,419	0.7
Ruthenians	22,667	0.4	23,720	0.3	25,650	0.3	26,251	0.3
Slovaks	73,140	1.1	75,027	1.1	77,837	1.0	76,733	0.9
Turks	1,914	0.0	54,526	0.8	44,434	0.6	18,220	0.2
Gypsies	52,181	0.8	58,800	0.8	9,826	0.1	49,894	0.5
Other	157,443	2.4	89,911	1.3	30,152	0.4	35,545	0.4
Not declaring their nationality under Art 41 of the SFRY Constitution	-- --		-- --		-- --		4,486	0.1
Yugoslavs	-- --		-- --		20,079	0.3	123,824	1.5
Regional allegiance	-- --		-- --		-- --		9,428	0.1
Unknown	-- --		1,994	0.0	5,604	0.1	30,274	0.4

* Including also Ukrainians.

Analogies Are Not Valid

If the demand for Albanian statehood is based solely on the size of the Albanian nationality in SR Serbia, then a percentage between 13 and 14 percent (which we assume will be the share of Albanians according to this year's census) of the total population of Serbia need not be any imperative argument, since the Albanian ethnic minority represents barely one-seventh of that population. But if the point of departure is the size of the Albanian ethnic minority as compared to other ethnic minorities in SR Serbia, then probably the size of that ethnic minority, that is, the number of its members, is being suggested as an essential criterion for organizing its "state."

What, then, is the "optimal" size which an ethnic minority should attain so as to qualify for "statehood," who would affirm the "fairness" of that figure, or

perhaps it might be based on a "mechanical analogy": Every ethnic minority "automatically" qualifies for "statehood" when it attains the size of the smallest nationality in our Federation!

Such analogies have unfortunately been made by comparing the size of the Montenegrin nationality and also of certain others and the size of the Albanian ethnic minority, and since the latter is larger than the former, these common sensical lines of argument, based on that quantitative relationship in size of population, "consider" that the Albanian ethnic minority has "qualified" for a "state," that is, for a "republic."

If we set aside for a moment the fact that Montenegrins do not have any other national state except SR Montenegro, and that Albanians already have one--the Socialist People's Republic of Albania, but historical development, regardless of what kind it has been, has nevertheless in its way been "fair"--every people which has managed to institute itself as a nationality has also succeeded in forming its national state regardless of its size--large or small!

If history has "behaved" this way toward all nationalities and toward their right to self-determination in the form of a national state, how otherwise are we to approach the whole issue when it is a question of parts of nationalities that already exist, that is, when we are concerned with ethnic minorities!? Is it possible here to go below the level of that "historical fairness" we mentioned and to shut our eyes, make an exception from the rule, and by some arbitrary decision "grant" the privilege to the Albanian ethnic minority in Kosovo to organize itself as a state? On behalf of what would such an arbitrariness be possible? If one is to judge by the demand that was made in Kosovo--on behalf of "greater and more reliable safeguarding of the principle of equality" of the Albanian ethnic minority.

But when it comes to the "principle of equality"--that principle might apply to any ethnic minority in SR Serbia and in any other republic, regardless of its size, that is, regardless of the number of its members. A principle is indeed not a principle if it applies only to one ethnic minority and not to all other ethnic minorities; in that case "on behalf of" equality an actual inequality would be established among the ethnic minorities in our country: Some would have the "right" to create "their own state," while others would not.

FOOTNOTE

10. The extent of the effort for the ethnic minorities in Yugoslavia to feel themselves completely free and equal is shown by the fact that their members also fly the flags of the states of their parent nationalities at various ceremonies and on other similar occasions. This might seem paradoxical to some people, since flags are symbols of states, but not of nationalities; the character of the states and of their regimes changes, and these changes are usually accompanied by changes in flags as well, either partially or completely, but that is the usual practice, and no one is changing it.

[Text] A Single Nationality May Not Have Two National States

If in turn this "right," as an expression of the principle of equality, were held by all, then in SR Serbia alone there might be some dozen or so little states belonging to the ethnic minorities; aside from the Albanians, that right might be taken advantage of by the Hungarians, Slovaks, Romanians, and others; the wheel of history would begin to turn back toward the Middle Ages, and this kind of artificial fragmentation of social and economic structures in accordance with the principle of tiny states of ethnic minorities would not only destroy the progressive course of integration and internationalization of human society up to now, but would turn it back¹¹ to the "medieval antiques of all sorts" which Marx discussed in his "Civil War in France."

So that is basically what would happen to our Yugoslavia if the slogan "Kosovo a Republic" were carried out! We apologize to the reader for our manner of exposition, but there was nothing we could do; this method was imposed on us by the topic itself--"Kosovo a Republic," that absurd and reactionary idea conceived in the head of some irredentist or inveterate and obstinate bureaucrat and nationalist in Kosovo.

The Nationality and the State

Second Reason. One nationality, as Marx and Lenin saw it, cannot have two national states. This is self-evident, since the process of formation of every nationality has been unified, but parts of varying size may have been left outside the boundaries of its national state (this has almost been the rule), but they figure as ethnic minorities in other states, usually neighboring ones.

If, however, we adopt the principle that ethnic minorities can also attain statehood, this would as a rule result in the creation of two or even more states and pocket states whose inhabitants would be members of one and the same nationality. Nor do we need any particular emphasis as to the extent of the various hazards this would represent not only for the nationality in which such processes were initiated, but also for international relations concerning the endeavors of two parallel states of one and the same nationality.

Since today's world has been divided into military-political blocs, and that division is extremely pronounced in Europe, it is easy to imagine the interest which the various blocs and their powers would have in the fate of these "newly generated" states, in their foreign policy orientation, in their political and ideological character, in their internal systems, and so on, and there would be fierce confrontations and even conflicts over all of these things. This is incidentally suggested by the experience with the existence of "dual" national states within one nationality created by the outcome of World War II and "sanctioned" by the subsequent development of the military-political blocs.

The border which divides those parallel national states of one and the same nationality is as a rule also the border between the military-political blocs,

which in and of itself indicates that those states are not creations of normal and natural economic and cultural and ethnic development within a nationality, but of their artificial division brought on by a large war.¹²

What Would Be All the Consequences

Third Reason. If two or more national states were to be created of the same nationality, there might be a dual process in their subsequent development: First, the tendency toward unification of the national states of the same nationality into a common unified state, which would signify secession of the ethnic minority from the state where it is located and its annexation to the parent state. Thus the issue of the equality of the ethnic minority would de facto be presented as a territorial problem, as a change of the borders that exist between the various states, and insistence on the status of a national state ("republic") within a previous state would be portrayed as nothing more than a farce, attainment of statehood in order to accomplish the ultimate goal of joining the parent state.

The second, if in actuality the process of instituting an ethnic minority as a new national state were confined within the existing framework, in the framework, say, of a federal state structure, then irredentist activity toward that federal community would be intensified, especially toward that national state which a given ethnic minority previously belonged to and there would also be division within the ethnic minority itself--for and against secession.

In both cases the issue of the given ethnic minority would be raised as a territorial problem--the problem of changing the borders that exist, and probably it could not be otherwise resolved than through armed conflict. Other situations are, of course, possible as well, especially if the social systems in the two states of the same nationality are essentially different; then there would inevitably be ideological disputes about whose system is better and more progressive, and such disputes--as experience demonstrates--are most difficult to resolve by an ideological struggle of opinions, all sorts of weapons, often without restraint, are brought to bear--from propaganda and psychological weapons to military weapons.

About the "Famous Argument"

Fourth Reason. The "strongest" and "main argument" of proponents of the thesis of "Kosovo a Republic" is the "national territorialistic" principle (Lenin's expression), which comes down to the quantitative relationship in the ethnic composition of the population. But even if this is taken as the exclusive point of departure, this "population principle" is not applied to the total population of SR Serbia, in which, for example, the share of the Albanian ethnic minority ranges between 13 and 14 percent, but only to the ethnic composition of the population in Kosovo. As if Kosovo were not part of SR Serbia, which is a national state and self-managing sociopolitical community of the Serbian nationality and members of the other nationalities and ethnic minorities which live together in it. But let us look first at the ethnic composition of the population in Kosovo.

Ethnic Composition of the Population of Kosovo

Nationality	Difference in Size of Popu- lation Between 1971 and 1981 (+ or -)	1971 Census	1981 Census	Index Number	Ethnic Compo- sition, %	
					1971	1981*
Total	340,867	1,243,693	1,584,560	127.4	100.0	100.0
Albanians	+311,256	916,168	1,227,424	134.0	73.6	77.4
Serbs	- 18,472	228,264	209,792	91.9	18.3	13.2
Montenegrins	- 4,680	31,555	26,875	85.2	2.5	1.7
Turks	+ 331	12,244	12,575	102.7	1.0	0.8
Moslems	+ 32,591	26,357	58,948	223.7	2.1	3.7
* Other	+ 19,841	29,105	48,946	168.2	2.3	3.1

Source: Bureau of Statistics of SR Serbia.

This table indubitably shows that the share of the Albanian ethnic minority in the composition of the total population in Kosovo has been growing rapidly, that it already constitutes three-fourths of that population, but that in Kosovo, along with the Albanian ethnic minority, there also live members of Serbian, Montenegrin, and other nationalities and ethnic minorities. There is, then, no "pure ethnos" of the Albanian minority, not now, nor has there ever been in Kosovo, otherwise there would have been no Albanian ethnic minority in Serbia either in the past or now. But we have already seen that this numerical relationship of Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo was at one time quite different.

The question of the ethnic minority, then, is ordinarily posed as a problem of living together on a territory with an ethnically mixed population. It is not important how large that territory is, whether we are talking about an opstina, a region, a province or a republic, nor how many members of the ethnic minority there are; it is in any case a small ethnic group within a nationality, as a large social group, and the two must live together.

FOOTNOTES

11. "New York State . . .," Lenin says about the process of assimilation carried out by capitalism, "is like a mill grinding up ethnic differences. What is happening in New York on a large international scale is also happening in every large city and factory settlement. No one who is not steeped in nationalistic prejudice can fail to see in this process of assimilation of nationalities carried out by capitalism an immense historical process of breaking up the isolation of various bear dens—especially in backward places like Russia" ("Nationality Question . . .," p 66). It is true that Lenin favored voluntary assimilation, deprived of any sort of coercive pressure and oppression, but the Communist Party of Yugoslavia and LCY, since Tito came to head it, never favored equality of the ethnic minorities in any form of ethnic assimilation, but on the contrary always and consistently favored ethnic equality.

12. In its hankering for such a solution ZERI I POPULIT III says: "The Albanians of small Albania, amounting to nearly 3 million, or of large Albania ... exceeding 5 million, all are Albanians. There is no objection you can make to that, you chauvinist Serbian gentlemen. There are two Germanies, east and west, just as there are two Koreas, north and south, but no one doubts that there exists one people and one German nationality, just as there is one people and one Korean nationality." On the basis of that analogy ZERI I POPULIT argues for statehood to be granted to the Albanian ethnic minority in Kosovo as a part of the Albanian nationality.

[30 Jul 81 p 4]

[Text] Socialist Commitment to Community Rather Than Isolationism

For a moment let us set aside all three [sic--translator's note] of the reasons we have stated and take up the supposition that an ethnic minority has organized itself as a state in a part of the territory of the national state of a nationality. Using "its own" newly born state, the ethnic minority would begin to behave as the leading ethnic force in that state, and in its desire to emancipate itself, and probably to cure its own "minority complex"--it would strive toward ethnic homogenization of "its" territory, would exert more or less disguised pressure for emigration of the population belonging to other ethnic groups, would create artificial migrations, and these would be markedly inhumane and nationalistic in nature. If we merely glance at the table on the ethnic composition of the population in Kosovo, we note that the Serbian and Montenegrin population, for example, is diminishing there because of emigration, and we know that that trend has been a lasting one. And artificial ethnic divisions of that kind, especially if they are accompanied by ethnic convulsions and conflicts, would quickly evoke a reaction on the other side--the other nationalities would come to defend their portion of the population, and they themselves might take repressive steps for return of the population to the territory on which the ethnic minority has instituted itself as a state. Natural and economically motivated migrations, which are an imperative in development of the social division of labor, might be halted in that manner, and this would be regressive and indeed even reactionary!

That is why Lenin opposed exclusiveness, was against the Marxists "taking the position of the national territorialistic principle," and favored a determination of new national boundaries corresponding to contemporary capitalistic civilization, rather than "bureaucracy and Asiaticism."¹³

The Large Entities Would Impose Force

Fifth Reason. It is an illusion to suppose that strict ethnic delineation, including also the national states of small and large nationalities, even of ethnic minorities, would in and of itself ensure real national sovereignty and equality. If one is looking for solutions to the equality of nationalities exclusively through the state--then relations among the nationalities and ethnic minorities would be based on the balance of power: The larger and more numerous, those which are stronger and more highly developed in the economic and military

sense, would constantly impose their will and interests on the smaller and weaker nationalities and ethnic minorities; someone would always have the vanguard role and the others would have a subordinate role, not only in the Federation as a federal state, but also in the League of Communists. And as a rule in any society the relatively small and underdeveloped nationalities and ethnic minorities would have the worst of it.

The fact that the equality of the small ethnic groups (ethnic minorities) is sought and seen exclusively through the functions of a state, and indeed through its own organization as a state, signifies in and of itself distrust of the system of social self-management, but also indicates the statist and nationalistic nature of such demands. In other words, the proponents of such demands detach solution of ethnic problems and problems of relations among nationalities from their real working class foundation, destroy all the natural ties between real flows and events in socioeconomic relations and the equality of ethnic groups. That is why they seek the way out and the solution for "their own ethnic position" in a possible conclusion of agreement and bargaining among national bureaucracies, and when this does not succeed--then they make use of various forms of direct or indirect pressure, including demonstrations of uninformed and manipulated parts of the population. This, of course, is nothing specific to bureaucratic nationalism within an ethnic minority: A kind of fetishization of the national state is a fairly general tendency in recent years, but we will speak about that a bit further on.

The Slogan Concerning Vertical Linkage

Sixth Reason. Within the context of the slogan "Kosovo a Republic" the argument was also made of the so-called vertical linkage of all members of the Albanian ethnic minority regardless of the sociopolitical community where they live and work. This would signify political organization on the principle of ethnic characteristics rather than the geographic principle, that is, ethnic organization of the so-called bund type, against which Lenin waged a vigorous fight.¹⁴ In its essence this likewise signifies a so-called territorial assemblage of the Albanian ethnic minority in Yugoslavia under one "umbrella," that is, inclusion of parts of Serbia, Macedonia and Montenegro, the allegedly "compact Albanian regions" in the imagined "Republic of Kosovo," in another Albanian national state, this one within Yugoslavia. Of all the various arguments, this thesis seems to us the most reactionary, since it is based on two essentially nationalistic postulates: national isolationism and national chauvinism. The first would lead to an artificial and mechanical shattering and dismantling of complex multinational communities, which is what all of the socialist republics mentioned really are. In addition, this would be the basis for isolating the Albanian ethnic minority within the limits of its own "ethnicon," establishment of a Chinese Wall between "its territory" and the other nationalities of Yugoslavia, which is contrary to the objective patterns of social and economic integration of peoples and nations, to the creation and development of socialist commitment to community of the nationalities and ethnic minorities of Yugoslavia.

Isolationist Banishment

This kind of isolationist banishment from the life and communications within Yugoslavia would in and of itself and by virtue of its motive also predetermine the status and function of that "newly created" national state, which would again be multinational, but with an Albanian majority in the population. The tendency would be toward absolutization of the interests of the Albanian nationality, for it to consolidate itself in the position of the "leading nationality" in the newly created state, and the bureaucracy from its ranks would represent itself as centralism. Thus members of the other nationalities and other ethnic minorities living on the territory of the "newly created" state would find themselves in the position of ethnic minorities with respect to the Albanian nationality as the principal vehicle of statehood. This would have an impact on relations among the nationalities, above all in that state community which would be closed within itself, it would lead to mutual conflicts and would fan the flames chauvinism, and the outcome would be a majoritarian dominance by the larger, more numerous and stronger group over the smaller and weaker ethnic groups.

It would not, of course, be possible to resolve ethnic disputes in this case within the framework of the "newly created republic" (state); they would inevitably have an impact on overall relations among ethnic groups within the Yugoslav community. Then much larger and more numerous groups than the Albanian ethnic group "could emerge," and they also, on the basis of the same bund principle and "national territorialistic principle" might raise the issue of bringing together the parts of their own nationality living outside the boundaries of their national state. Albanians comprise about 7 percent of the total population in Yugoslavia, Serbs about 40 percent, Croats about 22 percent, and so on, so that there is no need to even mention what sort of dangers of all kinds to ethnic relations and ethnic equality might come from their demand for "territorial assemblage" of their nationalities.

All in all, from the standpoint of Marxism and the Yugoslav revolution and its theory and practice on the nationality question, stated briefly, these have been only the basic reasons why SAP Kosovo cannot be granted statehood in our federal system, that is, why the Albanian ethnic minority in Kosovo, since it is an ethnic minority, cannot institute itself as a national state.

FOOTNOTES

13. "Nationality Question . . .," pp 85-86.

14. Militating against the "Bundites" and the national liberalistic and bourgeois conceptions of the nationality question, Lenin, criticizing the well-known "Austrian Program," adopted at the congress, and its possible application in Russia, expressed this idea among other things: "The commune of German colonists in Saratovskaya Guberniya plus the German worker suburb in Riga or Lodz, plus the German settlement near Petrograd, and so on, make up the 'unified ethnic alliance' of Germans in Russia. It is obvious that Social Democrats cannot demand such a thing as to consolidate such an alliance, though by no means do they renounce, of course, the freedom of all

alliances, including alliances of as many communes of as many nationalities in a given state as you like. But separation of the Germans and so on under the constitution from different regions and classes of Russia to form a unified German national alliance might be an enterprise of priests, bourgeois, petty bourgeois, anyone you like—but not Social Democrats" (see Lenin's well-known "Critical Notes on the Nationality Question," in "Nationality Question . . .," p 75).

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CSO: 2800/313

ARCHBISHOP PROTESTS FINES FOR PUBLICIZING PILGRIMAGE

Zagreb GLAS KONCILA in Serbo-Croatian 26 Jul 81 p 13

[Excerpt] At the request (dated 8 July 1981) of the Zagreb SUP [Secretariat for Internal Affairs] section for combatting economic crime, the city magistrate courts initiated proceedings against Danijel Labas, parish priest of St Blaz parish in Zagreb, and Mijo Gabric, priest and GLAS KONCILA journalist. On 10 July 1981 city magistrate Mario Mestrovic heard the cases and fined the first 2,000 dinars and the second 1,600 dinars for having organized the production and distribution in Zagreb churches of leaflets and posters entitled "The 250th Pilgrimage of the City of Zagreb" (the poster invited people to the annual Bistrice pilgrimage).

In the request to initiate proceedings it was said that these leaflets and posters "can produce justified complaints and feelings of offense among working people and citizens because of the false and distorted public presentation of their progressive ideological-political commitment to the self-management socialist system." On 13 July 1981 the judge said, they "had offended and denigrated in public places the socialist and national feelings of citizens who are not members of the Catholic Church, thereby violating Article 3, Point 1 of the Law on Violations against Public Law and Order...."

Zagreb Archbishop Franjo Kuharic, before sentences were pronounced, sent to the city magistrate courts the following statement, to which he has not yet received a reply....

1. The pilgrimage of believers of the city of Zagreb to Marija Bistrica has a 250-year-old tradition.
2. The invitation to believers of the city of Zagreb was sent from the undersigned archbishop.
3. The undersigned Zagreb Archbishop is also the author of the text printed in the leaflet which is the subject of the indictment.

As a result, the Zagreb Archbishop takes responsibility for this text. If the basis for any legal blame is contained in it, let this "blame" be assigned to me and if the text is punishable, I personally accept also the penalty for this "fault."

4. The leaflet itself and the poster were distributed to believers within church premises and distributed according to the regulations of the Public Prosecutor. Thus, I see no legal violation here.

5. The title of the leaflet and poster is traditional and there have never been objections to such a title nor do we believe that any well-intentioned person could feel offended by this title.

6. I am aware of the fact that the text of the indictment is absurd and that which has been arbitrarily extracted from my text did not exist either in concept or intention. Perhaps the believers of the city of Zagreb have the right to consider themselves equal citizens of the city of Zagreb. The text of the indictment also offends all the believers of the city of Zagreb because it accuses them of backwardness when it places them in opposition to those who are "progressively, ideologically, and politically committed."

I believe that all this dramatizing of this year's pilgrimage is trumped up and is offensive to all of us who are believers.

7. It astonishes us that the bus transport enterprise which undertook the obligation to transport pilgrims to Marija Bistrica, has now just before the pilgrimage cancelled its obligation. We believe that this contradicts the public statements made about the full equality of believers in this society.

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